INTRODUCTION
respective implementation ranges. It is evaluated in an appropriate model of the transport system, 23 meaning that it has to be able to represent the system dynamics and responses to the proposed 24 policy measures. At the same time, it should be fast enough to test many policy combinations.
25
While an appropriate model is certainly most important, another fundamental part is the defini-26 tion of the possible policies (15) . Policy makers have the following possibilities to influence 27 the transport system: Through direct management they can optimize the usage of existing 28 infrastructure (e.g. traffic management), or, assumed sufficient financial means, they can provide 29 new or extend infrastructures and/or public transport services. Using taxes (incl. mobility 30 pricing) and subsidies, they can change the costs of certain modes versus others and of the 31 transport system overall, and using legislation, they can regulate the organization and usage of 32 the transport system (e.g. speed limits, priority lanes, etc.). And finally yet importantly, using 33 advertising campaigns, they can (try to) influence general attitudes towards different modes.
34
The third element is the definition of the target function. The goal of any transport system should 35 be to move people and goods fast, cheap, easy, safe, and sustainable. An optimal transport 36 system maximizes all these targets at the same time. However, as long as safe and cheap 37 beaming is not possible, trade-offs need to be assessed and priorities need to be set. While 38 endless variations in target weighting exist and any choice can be debated, the list of goals per 39 se is manageable and indicators can be found (18).
40
In summary, as literature shows (15) (16) (17) , combining the available possibilities to influence the 41 system with a comprehensive target function and an appropriate transport model effectively 42 allows identifying high-performing transport policy strategies.
44
While the above is an established methodology, attempts applying it to investigate how a 45 socially beneficial AV based transport system could and should look like are very limited so far.
46
Literature is so far mostly restricted to either describing the system qualitatively or focuses on detailed, mostly operational questions.
This study is an attempt to fill this gap. Starting from the current system and considering 1 financial and legislative constraints, this paper focuses on policies to influence the price of 2 existing transport services and the organization of future, AV-based transport services. Given the 3 importance of the value of travel time in AVs, but also its uncertainty, these policies are tested 4 against three assumed perceived travel times in AVs.
5
This set is evaluated against two performance indicators (instead of a single target function).
6
These are the total travel time of all trips in the area, representing the "output" of the transport 7 system, and total vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT) representing the costs required and external-8 ities produced.
9
The methodology is applied to the region of Zug, Switzerland. The region is modeled with 10 an agent-based transport model (MATSim, (19) ), which, given its ability to represent single 11 individuals (agents), is particularly suitable to investigate the impact of policy measures. In fact, 12 the impact at the systemic level is the consequence of individual reactions to the policies. 
18

METHODOLOGY
19
The methodology followed was proposed by May et al. (15) for the development of optimal 20 integrated transport policy strategies. They applied it to different European cities to evaluate 21 combinations of transport policies. Here, given that it is unknown when AVs will be available Third, their application in a model of the transport system.
31
With an analysis of the full policy ranges, not only the preferred strategy can be identified, 32 but also the transport system's sensitivity to the different individual policy measures can be 33 evaluated. The model used is a MATSim scenario of the Swiss area of Zug. An introduction to
34
MATSim and a description of the scenario follows in the next section.
35
Policy Measures
36
The selection of policy measures depends not only on the system characteristics, but also on 37 external restrictions. On top of the obvious ones, such as physical feasibility and financial 38 restrictions, the required political support is also a major condition, if not the most important 39 one. The policy measures proposed here were designed and selected with this in mind.
40
As mentioned earlier, the number of possible ways for policy makers to influence the transport 41 system are limited. Investments in services or infrastructure, influencing price through taxes (incl. 
Policy Measures for Existing Modes
2
Existing modes include mass transit public transport (PT), the slow modes (SM) walk and bike, 3 and motorized individual transport (MIT). For PT and MIT, the respective autonomous version 4 is assumed (aPT and aMIT).
5
The two policy measures aPT pricing and aMIT pricing were selected. Other possible measures 6 are not further investigated either for their political and/or financial feasibilities (e.g. infrastruc-7 ture projects), or for their impact being difficult to quantify (e.g. advertisement campaigns). A 8 closer investigation of other possible measures is part of future work.
9
These two are complemented by different assumptions on the possible comfort changes through 10 automation.
11
• Pricing of aPT represents any policy measures increasing or decreasing the user price 12 of aPT. The main policy lever is the level of subsidies. The automation of aPT (busses) 13 was estimated to half its production cost (2). As today subsidies cover 50% of the cost of 
19
• Pricing of aMIT aims at increasing or decreasing the average cost per distance for aMIT.
20
The main policy instruments to achieve this are taxes (e.g. on fuel or vehicles) or mobility public agency or by a private company, which can provide different comfort and price levels.
37
Other models and forms of future modes, such as for example autonomous mini-buses, point-to-38 point shuttles, etc. are neglected here.
39
The future form of organization of such services is an important question policy makers should 40 start to think about. If they will wait too long before taking action, the market will organize 41 itself. This might result in a suboptimal system from a societal point of view.
42
To represent these different forms of organization, the following services are proposed as "policy 43 measures": a monopoly aTaxi service, a monopoly aRS service, and an oligopoly in which six different services compete (3 aTaxi and 3 aRS).
1
Following the above assumptions, negative VOT is assumed to be the same for aRS as for PT, 2 while for aTaxis it is assumed 25% less negative (more comfortable). The monetary prices per 3 passenger kilometer (PPKM) for the services follow (2). The fleet sizes for the services were 4 estimated based on (10). They found that for a good level of service, one aTaxi could replace 5 four private cars. Here, the monopolist's fleet was expected to serve 25% of the population 6 with such a level of service. Therefore, 25% of 25% of the current car fleet of Zug (96'000 7 (23)) results in 6'000 aTaxis. For aRS, a 33.3% smaller fleet was assumed (4'000 vehicles).
8
In the competitive situation, each of the services is assumed to have a fleet of one third of the 9 respective monopolist (rounded up to the next 500 vehicles). This results in total 6'000 aTaxis 10 and 4'500 aRS AVs in the area, which increases to total fleet by 75% resp. 162.5% compared to 11 the monopolistic cases. This is realistic, as each service requires a substantial fleet to offer a 12 good service in the area.
13
This results in the following four cases: 3. An oligopoly of services, represented here by six services, three different experiences
19
(VOT as above, -25%, and +25%) and matching prices (price as above, +25%, and -25%) 20 and each with aRS (1'500 vehicles per service) or as aTaxis (2'000 vehicles per service). Table 1 . The MATSim functionality particularly important for this study, is the simulation of AVs 32 (14, 25) . In the basic configuration used here, it simulates AV-based taxi services organized 33 by a central dispatcher. Agents, which would like to use a taxi, place a request at the central 34 dispatcher, which looks for the closest free taxi and assigns it to the agent. The taxi serves the 35 agent and waits at the agent's destination for the next assignment. Relocation is not included.
24
36
The taxis are initially placed based on population density.
37
Additionally, it also allows for the simulation of ride-sharing (25 an AV shuttle will connect Zug main train station with a nearby research campus. Recently, the 8 canton of Zug was also selected by the Swiss Federal Government for a study on the potentials 9 and the possible effects of mobility pricing (30). A study on future transport systems and suitable 10 transport policies for Zug is therefore a good fit with these events. The scenario represents the full population, which means that every agent in the simulation inhabitants only ((32), outlined in Figure 1 ).
26
In the baseline scenario, the trip-based modalsplit of these agents is 14% PT, 42% MIT, and 
34
RESULTS
35
In total 72 scenarios were simulated. Each simulation was run for 250 iterations. This is a low consisting of both aTaxi and aRS services, lie in between the other two clusters.
11
The tight clustering of configurations shows that the chosen organizational model is the most 12 important determinant for future performance of the system. Other policy measures (price of 13 aMIT and aPT, VOT of aMIT) appear to have only a minor effect within the cluster.
14 Several AV scenarios produce substantially more TT than the rest of their service's cluster. These of the chosen policy measures, the additional VKM are bringing the system generally closer to 18 breakdown (major congestions) with occasional tipping.
19
Effect of Policy Measures on Total Travel Time
20
To analyze the effect of the different policy measures, Table 2 could a substantial increase in the price of aMIT (+25%). 
Monopolist aTaxi Strategies
10
Under the chosen pricing scheme and the provided fleet sizes, none of the aTaxi monopolists 11 could operate profitable. Excluding the outliers from the analysis, the average passenger trip 12 with an aTaxi was 1.84km long. To serve this trip, the average pick-up distance (driving distance 13 from the closest free aTaxi to the passenger) was 2.13km, leading to a productive to total VKT 14 ratio (= The results presented in this paper surprise in the sense that literature (e.g. (9, 11)) usually 27 assumes -more or less explicitly -that shared AV fleets improve the transportation system. Here, aPT).
8
The example of Uber in Manhattan (35) indicates that this is indeed a valid observation. There, 9 additional empty miles by Uber taxis combined with attraction of former pedestrians or PT users,
10
led to an increase of VKT in a system already operating at its limits and thus a worsening of the 11 overall situation.
13
Another surprise from the results is that policy measures (pricing of aMIT and aPT and reduction AVs. This was certainly expected differently and will be subject of future work.
17
The same applies to the observation that aRS services reached substantial mode shares (in for an "it will get worse before it gets better".
24
Small-scale experiments with AVs and the development of new services are to be encouraged as 25 long as it does not cause too much additional traffic and does not disturb the existing system.
26
When the day for large-scale introduction comes, policy makers should be aware however, that 27 such a system would likely represent a very attractive competitor for existing PT solutions and 28 SM.
29
Until this day comes however, policy makers are suggested to use the benefits of automation for 30 the improvement of the existing system -a finding also supported by other recent studies (37, 38).
31
To conclude, it might not be as clear that services based on shared AVs will actually improve 33 the overall performance of the system as often suggested. 
